The elite brain drain by Hunter, Rosalind et al.
IZA DP No. 4005
The Elite Brain Drain
Rosalind S. Hunter
Andrew J. Oswald
Bruce G. Charlton
D
I
S
C
U
S
S
I
O
N
 P
A
P
E
R
 S
E
R
I
E
S
Forschungsinstitut
zur Zukunft der Arbeit
Institute for the Study
of Labor
February 2009
 
The Elite Brain Drain 
 
 
Rosalind S. Hunter 
University of Warwick  
 
Andrew J. Oswald 
University of Warwick 
and IZA 
 
Bruce G. Charlton 
University of Newcastle 
 
 
 
Discussion Paper No. 4005 
February 2009 
 
 
 
 
IZA 
 
P.O. Box 7240   
53072 Bonn   
Germany   
 
Phone: +49-228-3894-0  
Fax: +49-228-3894-180   
E-mail: iza@iza.org
 
 
 
 
 
 
Any opinions expressed here are those of the author(s) and not those of IZA. Research published in 
this series may include views on policy, but the institute itself takes no institutional policy positions. 
 
The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center 
and a place of communication between science, politics and business. IZA is an independent nonprofit 
organization supported by Deutsche Post Foundation. The center is associated with the University of 
Bonn and offers a stimulating research environment through its international network, workshops and 
conferences, data service, project support, research visits and doctoral program. IZA engages in (i) 
original and internationally competitive research in all fields of labor economics, (ii) development of 
policy concepts, and (iii) dissemination of research results and concepts to the interested public.  
 
IZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. 
Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be 
available directly from the author. 
IZA Discussion Paper No. 4005 
February 2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The Elite Brain Drain*
 
We collect data on the movement and productivity of elite scientists. Their mobility is 
remarkable: nearly half of the world’s most-cited physicists work outside their country of birth. 
We show they migrate systematically towards nations with large R&D spending. Our study 
cannot adjudicate on whether migration improves scientists’ productivity, but we find that 
movers and stayers have identical h-index citations scores. Immigrants in the UK and US 
now win Nobel Prizes proportionately less often than earlier. US residents’ h-indexes are 
relatively high. We describe a framework where a key role is played by low mobility costs in 
the modern world. 
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The Elite Brain Drain 
 
 
Where scientific enquiry is stunted, the intellectual life of a nation 
dries up, which means the withering of many possibilities of future 
development... Einstein (1934, p.30) 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This study is an analysis of the international movement and productivity levels of elite 
research scientists.  We begin with data on Nobel Prizes.  We then construct a data set 
on the world’s most highly-cited physicists.  Although our sample, of 158 people, is 
inevitably a small one, the individuals covered within it seem of particular interest.  
The paper discusses the conceptual implications of the observed empirical patterns.   
We attempt to address questions such as the following [and give brief answers 
in parentheses]: 
? How mobile are the world’s top research scientists, and do they 
migrate disproportionately to the richest countries? [Very; yes] 
? Are elite movers more productive, on average, than elite stayers? [No] 
? How -- in the spirit of Freeman (2006) -- might the new world of 
globalization be expected to influence nations’ across-person 
productivity distributions? [To make them more similar] 
? Are physicists who migrate to the United States more productive than 
home-grown US physicists? [No] 
While there is a large literature on the brain drain1, few researchers have looked at 
migration among world-class scientists.   
To anticipate results to come, it is shown that nearly half of the elite physicists 
in our sample no longer work in the country in which they were born, that the major 
per-capita importers are the US and Switzerland, and that (at least within this sample 
of unusually highly-cited people) migrants and non-migrants have similar 
productivities as measured by citations h-indexes.  Those in the sample who move 
from Europe to the US go on to be neither more nor less distinguished than American-
                                                 
1    Space constraints mean that it is not possible to summarize the literature here, but valuable papers in economics 
include Beine, Docquier and Rapoport (2001, 2008), Bhagwati and Hamada (1974), Johnson and Regets (1998), 
Kanbur and Rapoport (2005), Saint-Paul (2004), Schiff (2005), and Grossman and Stadelmann (2008).  Like us, 
Stephan and Levin (2001) and Constant and D’Agosto (2008) focus on truly high-skill individuals.  Commander et 
al (2004) is a helpful survey, and Zimmermann (1995) and Stephan (1996) review parts of this literature.  See also 
Bekhradnia and Sastry (2005), Kuhn and McAusland (2006), and Zaiceva and Zimmerman (2008). 
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born elite physicists.  One way to make sense of all these patterns, we argue, drawing 
partly upon a simple formal model, is that in a world with low mobility costs the 
distribution of talent can be expected to be similar across different countries. 
 More broadly, this paper relates to policy issues discussed in, for example, a 
recent 2007 editorial in Nature, and a literature on the competitiveness of European 
and US economics and science (Levin and Stephan 1999; Machin and Oswald 2000; 
Regets 2001; Royal Society 1963; Oswald 2007b, 2009; Summers 2007; UUK 2007).  
Those persuaded by a sanguine view of international brain ‘circulation’, rather than 
drain, may wish to know that our later data paint largely a one-way picture, and one 
disproportionately towards the United States.   
 
2. Theoretical Issues 
 
Consider a world in which scientists vary in their innate ability and productivity.  Let 
a person’s productivity be q, which for simplicity here is defined to lie between 0 and 
1.  We can think of Nobel Prize winners, say, as having a level of q that is close to the 
upper bound of unity.   
Assume the talent distribution is described by a density function f(q).  Among 
‘elite’ scientists, define a cut-off minimum threshold of quality, given by q*.  Assume 
that such scientists can choose whether or not to move to a new country.  This 
receiving country is rich, by assumption, and will pay a percentage wage premium, p, 
compared to the home country.   
There is a cost of movement, c.  The model will be a timeless one, but this cost 
could be thought of as a continuing one per-unit-of-time.  It might, for instance, be 
viewed as, in part, capturing any continuing cultural and personal cost caused by 
living outside one’s nation of birth.   
The net utility levels of individuals are taken to be given by a simple additive 
form: 
 
Utility of a mover = (1+p)q – c (1) 
Utility of a stayer = q   (2) 
 
so that an individual will therefore choose to move if 
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(1+p)q – c – q = pq – c > 0.  (3) 
  
The productivities, on average, of the movers and stayers can then be 
calculated.  The average productivity of elite migrants is 
 
∫ ∫= 1
/
1
/
)(/)(
pc pc
dqqfdqqqfM   (4) 
 
By contrast, the average productivity of stayers (in the country to which the migrants 
are moving), who are drawn partially from a different segment of the talent 
distribution, is 
 
∫ ∫= 1
*
1
*
)(/)(
q q
dqqfdqqqfS   (5) 
 
The difference in mean productivities is therefore 
 
SMqpcDD −== *),,(   (6) 
 
and it can be checked that D(c, p, q*) is an increasing function of the mobility cost c, 
and equivalently a decreasing function of the premium p, so that for example: 
 
0)(/)(
1
/
1
/
≥−=+−=∂
∂ ∫ ∫ pcMdqqfdqqqfpccD pc pc   (7) 
  
If the cost of mobility and the premium are both positive, then in a large class 
of cases:  
 
D(c, p, q*) > 0  (8) 
 
and the quality of movers, on average, will exceed the quality of stayers.  This is 
because the return from moving is biggest for the most able people. 
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Put into words, if it is extremely costly to leave one’s country, only absolutely 
outstanding scientists will find it worth their while.  Such people will then stand out in 
ability among those of their adopted nation.  When the costs of international mobility 
are sufficiently low, however, elite migrants and elite non-migrants come from 
approximately the same section of the underlying talent distribution, and they will 
therefore have similar observed productivity levels.  In this case, as c declines, the 
difference D approaches zero. 
 Kwok and Leland (1982) also allow for distributions of ability in the two 
countries; but they assume the existence of asymmetric information, and conclude that 
in equilibrium the average productivity of movers will always exceed that of those 
workers who stay.  We later try to check that empirically.  New work on the theory of 
the brain drain, and how an optimizing government should act, includes Egger et al 
(2007) and Ionescu and Polgreen (2009). 
  
3. Earlier Evidence 
 
Levin and Stephan (1991) gathered data on the age and publishing 
productivity of PhD scientists in American institutions.  The authors examined six 
scientific specialities.2,3 They used four different measures for productivity4 and found 
that in five out of the six specialities -- particle physics being the exception -- an 
increase in age significantly reduced the level of productivity when controlling for 
ability and motivation etc. Weinberg and Galenson (2005) analysed the optimal 
productivity age of Nobel Prize winning economists. They concluded that 
experimental and applied economists peaked later in life, possibly due to accrued 
knowledge over time.  In contrast, theoretical economists did their best work early.  
Carayol and Matt (2005) combined both individual and collective factors to analyse 
influences on productivity. They studied more than a thousand faculty members at 
Louis Pasteur University.  Dietz and Bozeman (2005) looked at scientists’ inter-sector 
job movements within the US. They surveyed 1,200 scientists, from various fields, 
with 5,490 career moves between them. The authors showed that job transfers were 
                                                 
2   Three in physics (solid state/condensed matter physics, particle physics, and atomic and molecular physics) and 
three in Earth Science (oceanography, geophysics, and geology). 
3    Defined by Laudel (2003, p.218) as “a community of scientists who directly or indirectly interact in the 
production of new knowledge about a common subject matter”. 
4    Publication counts over two years; these publication counts adjust for co-authorship, and then adjust for journal 
impact factors (a measure of quality) and are finally adjusted for both co-authorship and journal impact factors. 
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associated with higher productivity. However, they could not prove a causal 
relationship. Laudel (2003) used bibliometric methods (analysing patterns in 
publications) to investigate the movement of elite scientists. Laudel (2005) extended 
her previous paper, examining the brain drain of elite scientists. She studied two 
different specialities, angiotensin and vibrational spectroscopy, and generated three 
important conclusions. First, micro-level studies may identify brain drain effects 
which macro studies do not, because migration flows can counteract each other. 
Second, some specialities have much higher levels of migration than others. Finally, 
migration generally occurs young, and before scientists have gained ‘elite’ status.  
In the work closest to our own, Ioannidis (2004) took a cross-section of 1,523 
scientists, including 46 physicists, from the Institute of Scientific Information’s (ISI) 
Highly Cited Researcher scientist lists.  Although the database had many missing 
observations (because of non-completion by the majority of individuals), the author 
was able to analyse the patterns in scientists’ countries of birth and their current 
country affiliations. There was great variation across scientific fields. On an aggregate 
level he found that approximately one third had migrated, and that three-quarters of 
this third had migrated to the US. Ioannidis argues that although migration may be 
good for science, because it exposes scientists to new ways of thinking, when one 
country experiences the majority of the net in-flows the other countries experience a 
damaging brain drain. He argues that for most fields, excluding those with highly 
specialised expensive equipment such as nuclear physics, keeping a small network of 
scientists, a critical mass, in a country is important if the field is not to stagnate. 
The previous literature identifies factors correlated with scientists’ 
productivity.  Our paper is a (retrospective) study of scientists’ mobility.  It is difficult 
to say what in the counter-factual case would have happened to the productivity of 
each physicist who migrated/remained.  Hence this paper cannot conclusively address 
the question: how does migration affect a person’s productivity?  Nor can we measure 
directly how scientists create externalities upon colleagues, although common sense 
and sources such as Laband and Tollison (2003) suggest they will.  Yet Waldinger 
(2008), using a natural experiment, finds spillover effects only on to coauthors rather 
than mere departmental colleagues.    
This paper provides new data and inquires into the nature of the productivity 
distribution -- across different scientists within a nation -- that we would expect to see 
under alternative assumptions. 
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4. Data on US and UK Winners of Nobel Prizes 
 
There is an anecdotal view that in the modern world the Unites States acts as a giant 
funnel of scientific talent.  We document facts consistent with that claim.   
We begin by recording the extent of the decline in the ratio of UK/US Nobel 
Prizes in science.  The results are presented in Table 1.  By using biographies and 
autobiographies on the official Nobel Prize web pages 
(http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/lists/all), we initially examined data since World 
War II on all Nobel prize-winners in science broadly defined (physics, chemistry, 
physiology/ medicine; and economics since 1969).  To do so, we treated the national 
affiliation of each laureate in the same way as the Nobel committee – which assigns 
the working address of the laureate at the time the prize is awarded.  However, official 
biographies are of varying clarity and completeness, and sometimes it was not 
possible to be sure of a laureate’s educational experience, or to allocate the national 
provenance of a prize (for example, when the laureate was retired at the time of 
award, worked in several countries or worked at an international laboratory such as 
CERN). Such laureates are omitted from the tabulation.  As a referee has pointed out, 
our approach assumes that the selection criterion for winning Nobels has remained the 
same through time. 
Table 1 shows the proportions of US relative to UK laureates for each of three 
20-year segments.  The data are for the period 1947-2006. For the first third of the 
period, 1947-66, the UK was a successful Nobel prize-winning nation.  It gained 
nearly half the number of prizes of the US.  Over the past 60 years the population of 
the US has approximately doubled from 150 million to 300 million while the UK 
population has only increased about 20 percent from 50 million to 60 million.  But 
UK success in winning Nobel science prizes has sharply declined both in relative US: 
UK terms over the whole period and in absolute numbers of UK laureates over the 
past 20 years.   
A much fuller analysis of UK is provided in the new work of Weinberg 
(2009). 
It may be assumed that a dominant scientific nation will attract high-quality 
scientists from other countries.  This can be studied for the US and UK by looking at 
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scientists who did their university education elsewhere, then migrated either to the US 
or UK, where they eventually received a Nobel prize.  The row in Table 1 ‘Immigrant 
after first degree’ gives the number of US or UK laureates who moved to the US or 
UK after they did their first college degree or equivalent; while the row ‘Immigrated 
after doctorate’ shows the US or UK laureates who had come to the country, where 
they later won the Nobel prize after completing their doctorate (PhD or an equivalent 
such as a medical degree). ‘Proportion of immigrant laureates’ is the total immigrant 
laureates (both after college and doctorate) expressed as a percentage of the total 
number of laureates. The proportion of immigrant laureates represents an approximate 
measure of a country’s power to attract the best (potential Nobel-prize-winning) 
scientists. 
These data reveal that in the past 20 years the UK has lost its previous ability 
to attract future Nobel-prize-winning scientists from elsewhere. There is also evidence 
of a decline in the percentage of immigrant laureates in the USA: immigrants are now 
only 19 percent of total laureates.  Considering the overwhelming dominance of the 
US in winning Nobel prizes during 1987-2006, the number of immigrant laureates 
might have been expected to increase. That this has not happened may indicate signs 
of increasing parochialism in US science, or perhaps increasing bureaucratic barriers 
preventing the easy movement of top class scientists into the US.  It should be said, 
however, that the lags between doing the work and receiving the prize make it 
difficult to say.  
Table 1’s row ‘UK to US migration’ shows the number of scientists during a 
20-year segment who were educated in the UK but then migrated to the USA and 
eventually were awarded a Nobel prize. (The reverse situation did not happen during 
the past 60 years – i.e. by the above definitions there were no UK laureates who had 
migrated from the USA). This number may be an approximate measure of the greater 
attractiveness of the US compared to the UK as a place of residence and work for the 
highest quality scientists. This suggests that the US has become more attractive to 
UK-educated scientists over the past 60 years.  In 1987-2006, for example, five out of 
fourteen of all UK-educated laureates had moved to the USA by the time they won 
the Nobel prize.  
 
5. Data on Highly-Cited Physicists 
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We now draw upon data on elite physics researchers.   
In our analysis, the numbers of physicists in each country at first degree and 
the number currently affiliated are measured, and the net gain for each country can 
then be established. This is then normalised for population size (source: OECD 
Statistics). Country of first degree is used rather than country of birth. Each country’s 
net gain is then compared to measures of its wealth to assess if there is a correlation.  
There are several ways to calculate a scientist’s career productivity.  They 
include the total number of publications, average citations per paper, and total 
citations. This paper uses a particular citations measure, the h-index. The h-index was 
proposed by Hirsch (2005), who is a physicist by profession, as an attempt to 
“quantify the cumulative impact and relevance” of an individual’s scientific research 
output (Hirsch 2005, p.16,568). The measure incorporates a flavour of both quality 
and quantity of publications. Inevitably, the use of a single measure has disadvantages 
as well as advantages (Henrekson and Waldenstrom, 2007). 
By definition, an h-index of x means that a scientist has x number of papers 
with x or more citations. This is calculated by ranking a physicist’s papers from the 
most-cited to the least-cited and then descending down the list until the rank of a 
paper becomes greater than or equal to the number of citations to that paper.  The rank 
of this marginal paper is the h-index. 
Like other measures of productivity, the h-index has drawbacks.  First, it is 
affected by career length. Second, although a high h-index typically signifies a high-
quality scientist, the reverse is not always true (Hirsch 2005, p.16,571); a scientist 
with only a few highly cited papers may have a fairly low h-index no matter how 
important the papers. Third, citations may always not capture a physicist’s true impact 
if there is a bias towards English-language journals (Van Leeuwen et. al. 2001). The 
h-index also does not account for the number of co-authors on each paper. Hirsch 
(2005, p.16,574) suggests a normalization of the h-index for the number of co-
authors; however, as discussed by Laudel (2003, p.221), there is no easy way of 
establishing the relative levels of contribution for each co-author. Normalization 
would underestimate the output of those who gave a high proportion of the input but 
with a large number of co-authors and vice versa. Accordingly, the h-index here is not 
adjusted. 
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6. The Sample of Physicists 
 
Our main sample is drawn from www.isihighlycited.com.  We take the ISI list of 
physicists, which contained at the time of data collection the names of the 272 most-
cited scientists writing in physics journals between 1981 and 1999. Laudel (2003, 
p.219) argues that the ISI’s subject groupings are not sufficiently broken down into 
specialities, and therefore that in-depth analysis of ‘cause and consequences’ of 
migration cannot be analysed. However, data on these factors, such as R&D funding, 
do not have sufficient coverage over physics, let alone its specialities, for that depth of 
analysis to be undertaken.   
The data-collection process took some time.  We searched for biographical 
and bibliometric information on each of the 272 listed highly-cited physicists.  We 
particularly wished to determine career movements and overall career productivity.  
For each person, their year and place of birth, of first degree, and of PhD, were 
recorded.  So was country of current affiliation. Data were initially gathered from the 
ISI website and then from physicists’ own web-pages. This was followed by a further 
search of the internet.  To gather further information beyond what was available 
through the web, emails were sent to 146 physicists where their email addresses could 
be identified.  Of these, 63 replied.  
In this way, we eventually compiled a data set on 158 highly-cited physicists.  
However, we obtained data on their first degrees for only 150 of them.  Other 
aggregate data, on countries of origin and of current affiliation, were collected from 
OECD Statistics. The data for variables such as GDP were averaged between 1970 
and 2006 to cover the main period during which the physicists were active. Data were 
available for 21 countries5.  In order to maintain consistency, data for the missing 
countries6 were not collected from other sources  
Our physicists currently live in 16 different countries.  This produced some 
language difficulties for us.  We could read websites well only in English or Italian.  
We used some online translators.  Emails were sent in English. To examine a possible 
bias towards English speaking countries, the proportions of the final 158 physicists 
can be compared to those of the original 272.  The extent of bias seems small. The 
                                                 
5   Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, 
New Zealand, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, UK and USA 
6    Israel, Argentine, Chile, China, India, Russia, Brazil, Iran, Taiwan 
 10
                              
USA, however, appears to be overrepresented, and Japan to be underrepresented.  
There is no clear way to solve this problem -- our response rate (43%) is similar to 
those of previous studies (Laudel 2003, p.224) -- although it is considered later. 
The next issue was how to calculate productivity levels.  We decided to focus 
on citations rather than numbers of publications7.  The ISI Web of Knowledge was 
used to calculate the h-index.  This required us to identify each physicist’s publication 
list, which can be problematic when some physicists have the same surname. We 
decided to consider each individual separately.  In many cases, initial inspection 
showed no problems; physicists had identified how many papers they had published. 
However, sometimes further examination of the names used on published papers and 
the institutions worked for had to be undertaken.  In two cases, we had such 
difficulties distinguishing names that the physicists had to be removed from the 
sample. One advantage of working with the h-index is that the probability of a second 
physicist with the same surname and initials appearing within the relatively small 
selection of papers which affect an h-index score is lower than occurs when using data 
on an entire list of publications.  Of the sample of 158 physicists, 1 is female, and 8 
have won Nobel prizes.  A referee has pointed out that 8 seems a small number given 
this distinguished group, but presumably some of these scientists will win the prize in 
the future.  The majority, 61.4%, have worked in multiple countries, and 97.5% have 
worked in multiple institutions.  Currently 76% are affiliated to a university; 17% to 
other types of public institutions; and 7% are in private institutions. Regarding the 
span of their careers, 96% have, at some point, worked in academia since their PhD; 
54% have experienced another type of public institution; and 47% have spent a period 
in the private sector. The mean number of institutions worked in is 6.03.  The mean 
number of countries worked in is 2.41. 
 
7. Migration and Productivity 
 
These physicists were born in 32 different countries.  They studied for their first 
degree in 30 different countries; they did PhDs in 22 countries; and they are presently 
located in only 16 countries. Hence the data show a kind of ‘funnelling’ effect of 
                                                 
7   We had to distinguish between good scientists and outstanding ones.  Citations, although not perfect, therefore 
seemed the best metric.  As pointed out by Starbuck (2005), Oswald (2007a) and others, even prestigious journals 
publish large numbers of papers that make little impact.  See Van Raan (2000) for more on the use of citations. 
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approximately 50% from birth: people from 32 nations now reside in half that 
number.  
The percentage of physicists present in each country shows a gradual 
funnelling effect towards the USA (Table 2 and Figure 1). At birth, 29.7% of 
physicists are in the USA.  This increases to 43.4% at first degree, to 55.1% at PhD, 
and to 67.1% presently. The proportion in the 2nd and 3rd-ranked countries falls by 
approximately 3 percentage points from birth to present day, with the share through 
time in the rest of the world falling dramatically from 56.4% at birth to only 19.6% 
presently. 
Overall, 44% of scientists have moved since birth, 33% since their first 
degree, and 27% since their PhD. These proportions are in fact only a little different 
from those of Ioannidis (2004) who, on a much smaller sample, found 50% of 
physicists had moved since birth.  We have data on 158 physicists compared to 46 in 
Ioannidis’s work. 
The summary statistics for the individuals’ h-index scores can be seen in Table 
3. The mean h-index over the sample is 58.97.  The minimum and maximum values 
are 22 and 115 respectively.   
In order to examine the effect of co-authorship, the number and countries of 
the co-authors of ten randomly selected physicists in the sample were examined. The 
average number of co-authors for each of the ten varies enormously and the number 
of affiliated countries from 1 to 7.25.  Although there is a tendency for those with 
more co-authors to have higher h-indexes, the evidence is not substantial. This gives 
us some reassurance in the decision to not try to adjust h-indexes for co-authorship. 
For our sample, we compared these h-index results with the physicists’ total 
number of published papers, total citations, and average citation count per-paper. For 
the h-index, there is no correlation with the last of these, average citations per article.  
But there is a significant positive correlation of 0.40 with total number of published 
papers, and of 0.54 with total citations.  People with a high h-index also score highly 
on these two criteria. 
Figure 2 shows that those currently in the USA have an h-index which is on 
average 5.71 higher than those in non-USA institutions.  This difference -- one that 
continues to hold weakly when we adjust the data using regression equations -- is 
close to statistically significant at the 5% level.  There are several possible reasons for 
this, which we discuss later in the paper. 
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We now separate the sample into those who have migrated and those who 
have not.  Whether we work with the periods since birth, BSc. or PhD, we find no 
statistically significant difference in productivity as measured by an h-index (Table 4).  
There is no way of measuring the productivity levels in the alternative situation. 
However, Figure 2 suggests that there are country-specific effects. 
A natural question for economists is how effectively the rich countries draw in 
others’ top scientists.  Figure 3 demonstrates this for Switzerland and the USA. Figure 
4 reveals a relationship between the net gain in physicists and the R&D adjusted GDP 
per capita.  The correlation coefficient is then 0.49, significant at the 5% level.  
Physicists migrate toward richer countries, although the definition of rich should be 
adjusted to mean rich in R&D funding.  Data on the level of physics funding would be 
still better, but we found it too hard to obtain data consistently across nations.  
Figures 5a and 5b depict the productivity levels between continental8 
migratory groups, looking at differences between country of first degree and present 
affiliation. Table 5 gives fuller data.  Those individuals who emigrated from Europe 
to North America emerge as the most productive with an average h-index of 63.1. 
Those who remained in North America are the second most productive group: their h-
index is 61.2. The final three major groups -- those who remained in Europe, 
remained in Asia, and moved from Asia to North America -- have average h-index 
scores of 56.1, 56.1 and 55.5, respectively. The only statistical significance at the 5% 
level here is between those who remained in North America and remained in Europe. 
There are other migratory groups, within the sample, with only a couple of 
representatives.  This means that meaningful averages could not be constructed.  
It seems interesting to note that no physicist left North America nor remained 
in South America.  The European physicists who moved to North America have 
productivity levels more in line with those of the natives than those left in Europe. 
The two Asian values are statistically the same.   
Some caution should be shown when looking at these results. First, the sub-
samples are small, especially for movers. Only 8 Europeans migrated to North 
America while 91 remained in North America.  
To this point, we have shown only raw patterns in the data.  We now turn, in 
Table 6, to regression equations.  The dependent variable here is at first, in the upper 
                                                 
8   United Nation’s Statistics Division country classification; Russia is included in Europe, and Turkey in Asia. 
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part of the table, the logarithm of the scientists’ h-indexes.  In the lower half of the 
table, it is the log of total citations to their work.   
Going from left to right, the columns of Table 6 gradually build up from a 
simple to a fuller regression specification. Older people tend to be more cited; this is 
to be expected merely because career length affects the period over which citations 
can be accrued.   Having ten additional years after the year of the PhD increases a 
physicist’s h-index by 6%.  Being born in the United States has a statistically 
insignificant effect.  Residing in the US, however, does have a positive coefficient; it 
is associated9 with an h-index approximately 13% higher.  Nevertheless, this effect 
loses statistical significance by the final column of Table 6. In these regression 
equations, the adjusted R-squared values are fairly low.   
Table 6 includes a simple direct test for an interaction effect.  Are those who 
were educated initially outside the United States, but now reside in the USA, more 
productive (in the sense of having higher h-index scores)?  No, not than Americans.  
In the final column of Table 6, it can be seen that the coefficient on the variable ‘BSc 
outside the US* Now in USA’ is approximately -0.02 with a t-statistic of -0.25.  
Hence it is essentially zero.  Migrant elite physicists into the United States do not 
have an h-index that differs, ceteris paribus, from the h-index of home-grown elite 
physicists. 
The tenor of these conclusions is replicated for the lower panel, using instead 
Log of Total Citations as the dependent variable, in Table 6. 
Table 7, following a referee’s suggestion, does a further check.  It breaks the 
data down by the time point of migration to the United States.  Interestingly, whatever 
the stage at which someone migrated, their h index is approximately the same as that 
of those physicists born in the US.  The null of equality of the various key 
coefficients, as in column 1 of Table 7, cannot be rejected at conventional 
significance levels.  Here the size of effect in the h-index regression equation is 
fractionally larger than in Table 6’s estimates; it varies from 14% to 19%.  
The results provide a little evidence that some groups are more productive 
than others, and in particular that everyone working in the United States tends to have 
a higher h citations score.  However, the reasons for this are more ambiguous. As 
previously mentioned, there is no clear causal relationship between migration and 
                                                 
9   The exact effects are calculated from: 100(exp(β)-1) . 
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productivity. Put into context, migrating to the USA may make you more productive 
(direction one) but also the most productive people may be those who are offered jobs 
in the USA (direction two).  Another, and a more sociological, possibility is that those 
in the American scientific circuit simply cite each other 13%-19% more.  All three 
arguments are plausible, perhaps jointly play some role, and have implications for 
discussions on the brain drain.  Yet with these data it is not possible to distinguish 
among them. 
If direction one is the overriding influence then the world body of scientific 
knowledge gains from the migration because of the increase in productivity. 
However, there are further implications for the country left if the field stagnates or 
disappears. If direction two is the overriding influence, then the USA is taking the 
best physicists, although it already had a large portion of them.  It is the success of 
this home-grown group of US physicists that suggests it is the resources in the USA 
that make their physicists the most-cited.  Even so, there are other explanations for 
this apparent difference in productivity, not related to aiding priority, namely that 
there are possible biases in the productivity measure. There are suggestions that US-
based scientists disproportionately cite other US-based scientists (Leimu and 
Koricheva 2005). However, Wong and Kokko (2005) indicate that this is in fact a 
location bias: Europeans also disproportionately cite other Europeans.  A second 
issue, regarding language, arises: the publications used for citation counts by the ISI 
being substantially in English.  This may reduce the citation counts of those who 
publish in languages other than English (Van Leuween et. al. 2001), although articles 
in local languages would also be cited less as they are accessible to fewer readers. 
Van Leuween et al argue that the research impact of countries such as Germany and 
France would increase if more foreign publications were accounted for.  
To investigate whether h-index productivity relates to other measures of 
productivity, we compared each country’s h-index rank to its patent productivity rank 
and its general productivity growth rates.   
The results are that h-index rank positively correlates (0.66) with patent rank 
and with overall productivity for the majority of the countries (0.66, excluding 
Finland and Italy).  Hence those countries with the highest average h-indexes also 
tend to have higher productivity measured in other ways. The patent productivity 
finding seems particularly relevant as it also measures R&D in which physicists are 
involved.  This will, at least in part, be affected by the same incentives.  Such an 
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analysis suggests that the higher level of productivity shown in the US data is not 
substantially due to a US/English bias. 
A natural question is whether the paper’s finding of approximately equal 
productivities for migrants and non-migrants holds for elite scientists in other 
disciplines.   
The only other data available to us are for bio-scientists.  Again, these use ISI 
highly-cited scientists as the sample.  Appendix Table A4 shows that, as with physics, 
it appears that movers and stayers have similar h-indexes.  Further discussion for bio-
sciences is contained in the unpublished report by Warwick University (2007).   
Finally, a high level of elite mobility has also recently been reported for young 
economists in Oswald and Ralsmark (2007).  Figure A1 reveals that in the top-10 US 
departments of economics approximately 75% of assistant professors did their first 
degree outside the United States.  This is consistent with, although necessarily not 
precisely comparable to, the findings from our data on senior physicists. 
 
8. Conclusions  
 
This paper attempts to contribute to knowledge about the nature of the elite brain 
drain.  It draws five conclusions.   
First, the United Kingdom currently wins fewer Nobel Prizes in science than it 
used to10, and the United States garners many more.  What is less widely known is 
that, in both the UK and the United States, immigrant scientists win the Prize less 
often, proportionately, than in earlier decades.  Second, by charting the careers of a 
group of distinguished physicists, we show that they are strikingly mobile. Almost 
half of the highly-cited scientists in our sample are migrants: our 158 physicists were 
born in 32 countries but now live in only 16.  Approximately 30% migrated after their 
first degrees, and went predominantly to the US.  Third, among highly-cited 
physicists the average productivity (as measured by a citations h-index) of movers is 
not different from that of stayers11.  We are unable, with our data, to say whether 
migration itself causally increases a scholar’s productivity, but it might be argued that 
                                                 
10   Nevertheless, as a referee has emphasized to us, the UK still does well in most sciences by the standards of 
other European countries. 
11   This is somewhat against the spirit of, for example, Pierson and Cotgreave (2000), who focus, arguably a little 
strangely, on citations per paper rather than on total citations (their data show that stayers write more papers than 
movers, but the authors do not discuss this fact). 
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our results are consistent with Waldinger’s (2008) finding that -- except for coauthors 
-- there are no strong externality effects among senior scholars.  Fourth, international 
flows of physicists between first degree and the present day demonstrate that top 
scholars head to countries with high levels of R&D spending.  Switzerland and the 
USA are the world’s large importers, per capita, of elite physicists.  CERN in 
Switzerland must play some role here, but, because of difficulties caused by multiple 
affiliations, we have not attempted to separate out those scientists.  Fifth, we find 
evidence, from regression equations in Tables 6 and 7, that among elite physicists a 
current affiliation in the USA is associated with a 13%-19% higher h-index.  This 
may be a genuine productivity difference, or reflect some form of pro-US citations 
bias, or some mixture of the two. 
How, conceptually, can we make sense of the data?  One way to view the 
findings on physicists is as supporting a theoretical model in which in the modern 
globalized world the costs of migration are low.  Intuitively, the idea is the following.  
Consider a world with very high costs -- whether because of cultural differences 
across societies, or costly travel, or poor communication -- of switching between 
countries.  Then only the very best workers will migrate.  This is because they alone 
are the ones who will make a big enough return from international labour mobility to 
outweigh the high costs.  In that case, migrants will be disproportionately from the top 
end of the ability distribution.  They will be outstanding scientists with, in our 
terminology, particularly large h-indexes.  Now contrast this with the case of low 
mobility costs.  In that case, elite scientists of more average kinds of abilities, like the 
norm within the country into which they migrate, will find it rational to choose to 
switch nations.  Hence mobile incoming scientists will be of similar quality to the 
average of those in the receiving nation, and most of these newcomers will not go on 
to win science prizes in the way that happened in an older world -- think of an early 
20th century setting of ocean liners and telegrams -- where mobility costs were high12.  
Any increases through time in the wage premium (p in our earlier notation) earned by 
distinguished scientists in the rich receiving countries will act to reinforce these 
tendencies. 
  
                                                 
12   Although lower mobility costs alone do not imply that the absolute numbers of immigrant Nobel winners 
would fall. 
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Table 1 
 
The Number of Science Nobel Prizes Won by the United States Relative  
to the United Kingdom (1947-2006) 
 
 
 1947-66 1967-86 1987-06 
 
 
Proportion of UK-based Nobels as a % of US   44%  28%  8% 
 
# Nobels won (US:UK)     45: 20  85: 24  112: 9  
 
# Who were immigrants after their first degree   1: 1  3: 1  7: 0 
# Who were immigrants after their doctorate  10: 2  22: 5  14: 0 
 
Percentages of laureates who were immigrants  24%: 15% 29%: 25% 19%: 0%                                  
 
#UK migrants to USA who won a Nobel  0  5  5 
 
 
Notes 
(i) US relative to UK numbers are expressed in this table as X: Y 
(ii) The population of the US is now approximately fivefold that of the UK, so 
on arithmetical grounds in the current era the expected ratio is 5:1. 
 
Source 
Own calculations from www.nobelprize.org.  Charlton (2007) uses different 
definitions and categories, and does not study immigrants. 
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Table 2 
The International Distribution of Highly-Cited Physicists at Each Career Stage  
from Birth to the Present (% shares) 
 
 At birth  (32 countries) 
At BSc.  
(30 countries) 
At PhD  
(22 Countries)
Now  
(16 countries) 
1st USA (29.7%) USA (43.0%) USA (55.1%) USA (67.1%) 
2nd UK (10.9%) Germany (8.6%) UK (8.9%) Germany (7.6%) 
3rd Germany (9.4%) UK (7.9%) 
Germany 
(8.2%) 
Switzerland 
(5.7%) 
Others 50.0% 40.2% 27.8% 19.6%13
 
Notes 
The top left-hand number of 29.7% means that at the point of birth the United States was home to 
29.7% of those in our sample who would go on to become the world’s most distinguished physicists.  
Today, as shown in the top right-hand number, 67.1% of the 158 live and work in the United States.   
 
 
                                                 
13   The UK was ranked 5th with 3.8% of the physicists, after Japan which was 4th with 4.4%. 
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Table 3 
Summary Data on Physicists’ h-index Scores 
Number of 
observations 158 
Mean 58.97 
Standard Deviation 13.52 
Minimum 22 
Maximum 115 
Median 57 
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Table 4 
 
Productivity Levels (as measured by physicists’ h-index levels) Between those 
who Moved Country and those who did not Move 
 
Stage 
 
Stayers 
 
Average h-index if 
not moved country 
since the stage 
indicated 
Movers 
 
Average h-index if 
moved country since 
that stage 
Statistically 
different? 
Birth 60.69 57.66 No, t = -1.24 
BSc. 60.04 59.21 No, t = -0.36 
PhD. 59.19 58.38 No, t = 0.33 
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Table 5 
 
Migratory Groups and Average h-index Scores 
Country BSc Country Now Number Average h-index 
Asia Asia 10 56.1 
Asia Europe 1 59 
Asia North America 6 55.5 
Europe Europe 31 56.1 
Europe North America 8 63.1 
North America North America 91 61.2 
Oceania Europe 1 57 
Oceania Oceania 1 54 
South America Europe 1 55 
South America North America 2 52 
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Table 6 
Regression Equations on Physicists’ h-indexes and Total Citations  
(t-statistics in brackets; * indicates significant at the 5% level) 
Dependent Variable: Log of h-index 
Constant 3.834* (53.23) 
3.828* 
(48.39) 
3.804* 
(48.71) 
3.737* 
(44.92) 
3.739* 
(44.62) 
Years since  
Phd 
0.006* 
(3.10) 
0.006* 
(2.73) 
0.006* 
(2.55) 
0.007* 
(2.96) 
0.007* 
(2.94) 
USA Born  0.037 (0.83) 
-0.049 
(-0.88) 
-0.063 
(-1.14) 
-0.071 
(-1.10) 
USA Phd    0.131* (2.56) 
0.058 
(0.95) 
0.051 
(0.75) 
Now in USA    0.121* (2.13) 
0.137 
(1.59) 
BSc outside 
USA * Now 
in USA 
    -0.0186 (-0.25) 
 
R2 0.057 0.060 0.104 0.134 0.134 
 
R2adj
0.051 0.046 0.084 0.107 0.101 
Number of 
observations 158 138 138 138 138 
 
Dependent Variable: Log of total citations 
Constant 9.161* (67.83) 
9.150* 
(62.40) 
9.120* 
(62.17) 
9.023* 
(57.33) 
9.027* 
(56.95) 
Years since  
Phd 
0.015* 
(3.79) 
0.014* 
(3.45) 
0.014* 
(3.32) 
0.015* 
(3.60) 
0.015* 
(3.56) 
USA Born  0.073 (0.88) 
-0.034 
(-0.33) 
-0.054 
(-0.52) 
-0.071 
(-0.58) 
USA Phd    0.163 (1.70) 
0.058 
(0.50) 
0.044 
(0.34) 
Now in USA    0.175 (1.63) 
0.208 
(1.27) 
BSc outside 
USA * Now 
in USA 
    -0.038 (-0.27) 
 
R2 0.084 0.090 0.109 0.127 0.127 
 
R2adj
0.078 0.077 0.090 0.101 0.094 
Number of 
observations 158 138 138 138 138 
 
 27
                              
 
Table 7 
Alternative Regression Equations on Physicists’ h-indexes 
(t-statistics in brackets; * indicates significant at the 5% level) 
Dependent Variable: Log of h-index 
      
Constant 3.712* (43.28) 
3.835* 
(53.23) 
3.732* 
(47.75) 
3.731* 
(47.35)  
Year since Phd 0.007* (3.14) 
0.006* 
(3.10) 
0.007* 
(3.34) 
0.007* 
(3.38)  
 
USA Born – left USA  
(1 person) 
-0.115 
(-0.50) - - -  
USA Born – stayed 
(40 people) 
0.143* 
(2.28) - 
0.111* 
(2.38) -  
USA Born – all 
(41 people) - - - 
0.103* 
(2.19)  
Migrated to USA at BSc 
(28 people) 
0.185* 
(2.78) - 
0.155* 
(2.96) 
0.153* 
(2.89)  
Migrated to USA at Phd 
(15 people) 
0.159* 
(2.05) - 
0.129* 
(1.96) 
0.126 
(1.91)  
Migrated to USA post-Phd 
(22 people) 
0.151* 
(2.13) - 
0.121* 
(2.10) 
0.119* 
(2.05)  
Visited USA otherwise  
(33 people) 
0.053 
(0.82) - -   
 
R2 0.133 0.057 0.127 0.122  
Adj. R2 0.092 0.051 0.098 0.093  
 
Notes: 
• Sample size is again 138 
• There are 19 in the never been to USA category 
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Figure 1 
 
The Funnelling of Elite Physicists Towards the USA 
 
Sample Size: 158 
Error:   Country of birth missing: 20 (12.7%) 
BSc country missing: 7 (4.4%) 
PhD country missing: 0 (0%) 
Current country missing: 0 (0%) 
The location of highly-cited physicists through their career
80.0%
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Figure 2 
Mean h-index of Physicists by Current Geographical Location 
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Note 
This difference is not (quite) statistically significant at 5% on a 2-tailed test.
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Figure 3 
Brain-Drain Gains and Losses of Highly-Cited Physicists by Nation 
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Data scaled by 1,000. 
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Figure 4 
 
The Relationship Between R&D Expenditure per capita14 and 
 Net Gain in Physicists  
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Notes 
Each dot is a separate country.  The extreme top dot in the north-east of the diagram is 
Switzerland. 
                                                 
14    R&D expenditure as a percentage of GDP, GDP measured in US dollars, current prices and PPP’s. 
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Figure 5a: The h-index Scores of Movers and Stayers  
in Europe and North America 
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Figure 5b: The h-index Scores of Movers and Stayers  
in Asia and North America 
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Appendix 
 
Appendix Table A1: Net Losses and Gains in Physics Researchers by Country 
 Country 
Number after 
undergraduate
BSc. 
Number 
present 
day 
Net gain 
Net gain 
normalised by 
population 
Australia  4 1 -3 -0.183 
Austria 1 1 -1 -0.128 
Brazil 1 0 -1 -0.006 
Canada 5 2 -3 -0.112 
China 2 1 -2 -0.001 
Denmark 1 1 0 0.000 
Finland 2 2 0 0.000 
France 4 2 -2 -0.035 
Germany 13 12 -2 -0.028 
Greece 2 1 -1 -0.099 
Hungary 1 0 -1 -0.095 
India 2 0 -2 -0.002 
Ireland 1 0 -1 -0.286 
Italy 2 2 0 0.000 
Japan 8 7 -1 -0.008 
Rep. of Korea 1 0 -1 -0.024 
New Zealand 1 0 -1 -0.029 
Poland 1 0 -1 -0.027 
Russia 2 0 -2 -0.013 
Spain 2 1 -1 -0.026 
Sweden 1 0 -1 -0.011 
Switzerland 3 9 4 0.599 
Turkey 1 0 -1 -0.018 
UK 12 6 -6 -0.104 
USA 65 106 39 0.158 
 
  
 34
                              
Appendix Table A2: Comparison with Ioannidis (2004) 
Finding This paper Ioannidis - physics Ioannidis - overall 
Sample size 158 46 1523 
Moved since birth 44 % 50 %  33 (approx.) 
US-born scientists 
who migrated 0 % - 2 % 
Females 0.63 % - 3-4 % 
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Appendix Table A3: Summary Statistics – Highly Cited Physicists 
 
Presently in the USA 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
hindex 105 61.04 13.00 30 115 
results 105 383.82 208.25 56 1248 
avcite 105 57.52 36.56 15.74 216.84 
totalcite 105 18458.52 13727.75 7409 135831 
nocount 105 2.04 1.56 1 12 
noinst 105 5.91 4.32 2 25 
yborn 102 1947 9.928 1920 1976 
ybsc 101 1968 9.39 1941 1986 
yphd 105 1974 9.36 1947 1991 
 
Presently not in the USA 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
hindex 53 54.89 13.72 22 85 
results 53 445.60 270.99 82 1314 
avcite 53 47.08 34.33 4.95 179.48 
totalcite 53 15591.47 6757.03 2355 32714 
nocount 53 3.15 1.89 1 10 
noinst 53 6.26 4.44 1 21 
yborn 50 1945 8.31 1926 1974 
ybsc 44 1968 7.86 1951 1983 
yphd 53 1972 7.99 1955 1987 
 
Here, hindex is h-index; results is the number of papers; avcite is average cites per paper; total cite is total lifetime 
citations; nocount is missing; noinst is missing institution; yborn is year born; ybsc is year of BSc degree; yphd is 
year of PhD degree.  Further details are available in Hunter (2007) or on request.  
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Appendix Figure A1: Measurement of the Brain Drain among Elite USA-Based 
Assistant Professors of Economics 
Source: Oswald and Ralsmark (2007) 
 
Distribution of where the Bachelor of Science was 
obtained
Outside USA
75%
USA
25%
 
 
Note 
This draws upon data on 112 assistant professors in the top-10 US departments of 
economics. 
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Appendix Table A4: The h-indexes of Highly-cited Bio-scientists Currently 
Working in the United States  
Source: Warwick University (2007) 
 
Sample size: 163 
Birth to BSc Mean Lower bound 
(95%) 
Upper bound (95%) 
Moved to US 88.60 70.51 106.69 
Remained 89.67 82.80 96.54 
BSc to PhD Mean Lower bound 
(95%) 
Upper bound (95%) 
Moved to US 83.38 78.13 88.62 
Remained 88.63 82.38 94.87 
 
 
 38
